Database or ledger file created by a script host or LOLBin

Siemphony@siemphonylowT1565unverified

Matches a file-create event where a database, ledger or embedded-store file is laid down by a scripting host, a signed-binary proxy or a transfer utility rather than by the engine that owns it, which is the "abnormal changes to structured data outside expected business process activity" half of AN0162. Read the scope narrowly: this is suspicious data-store file *creation*, not detection of records being altered in place. Sysmon EventID 11 fires on create and overwrite only, so a row edited through the application or through SQL produces nothing here, and a freshly dropped store is at least as consistent with T1074-style local staging as with manipulation meant to deceive — the rule cannot separate the two. The brief's EventID 2 (`file_change`) source sits closer to genuine in-place manipulation but is a different logsource and needs its own rule. It also stands in for the stored-data case at the parent level: this is really T1565.001 territory, and when a T1565.001 rule is authored the two should be revisited and merged, with the parent left to carry .002 (transmitted) and .003 (runtime), neither of which this logic touches. Both lists are assembled here: MITRE names the `MonitoredFilePaths` and `AuthorizedProcesses` knobs, and a site should replace the extension list with its own critical data formats and the process list with the services that are actually entitled to write them. The rule is written in the Sysmon EventID 11 vocabulary (`TargetFilename`, `Image`); the Security EventID 4663 feed the brief also maps onto `file_event` splits the same facts into `ObjectName` and `ProcessName`, so it needs a field mapping before a SACL on the data directory would buy anything. UNVERIFIED AS AUTHORED — derived from MITRE ATT&CK DET0059, not hand-written and not tested by its author. Any lab result is on this rule's own page.Full description

The 4 SIEM queries below are previews produced by Siemphony’s own translator, not pySigma, and none has been executed against a real backend — review before you deploy.

detection.yml

Sentinel · KQL

Run this as a search.

DeviceFileEvents| where ((FolderPath endswith ".mdf" or FolderPath endswith ".ldf" or FolderPath endswith ".ndf" or FolderPath endswith ".mdb" or FolderPath endswith ".accdb" or FolderPath endswith ".sqlite" or FolderPath endswith ".sqlite3" or FolderPath endswith ".db" or FolderPath endswith ".dbf" or FolderPath endswith ".gdb" or FolderPath endswith ".qbw") and (InitiatingProcessFolderPath endswith "\\powershell.exe" or InitiatingProcessFolderPath endswith "\\pwsh.exe" or InitiatingProcessFolderPath endswith "\\cmd.exe" or InitiatingProcessFolderPath endswith "\\wscript.exe" or InitiatingProcessFolderPath endswith "\\cscript.exe" or InitiatingProcessFolderPath endswith "\\mshta.exe" or InitiatingProcessFolderPath endswith "\\rundll32.exe" or InitiatingProcessFolderPath endswith "\\regsvr32.exe" or InitiatingProcessFolderPath endswith "\\certutil.exe" or InitiatingProcessFolderPath endswith "\\curl.exe" or InitiatingProcessFolderPath endswith "\\python.exe" or InitiatingProcessFolderPath endswith "\\pythonw.exe" or InitiatingProcessFolderPath endswith "\\notepad.exe"))

Splunk · SPL

Run this as a search.

index=* ((TargetFilename="*.mdf" OR TargetFilename="*.ldf" OR TargetFilename="*.ndf" OR TargetFilename="*.mdb" OR TargetFilename="*.accdb" OR TargetFilename="*.sqlite" OR TargetFilename="*.sqlite3" OR TargetFilename="*.db" OR TargetFilename="*.dbf" OR TargetFilename="*.gdb" OR TargetFilename="*.qbw") AND (Image="*\\powershell.exe" OR Image="*\\pwsh.exe" OR Image="*\\cmd.exe" OR Image="*\\wscript.exe" OR Image="*\\cscript.exe" OR Image="*\\mshta.exe" OR Image="*\\rundll32.exe" OR Image="*\\regsvr32.exe" OR Image="*\\certutil.exe" OR Image="*\\curl.exe" OR Image="*\\python.exe" OR Image="*\\pythonw.exe" OR Image="*\\notepad.exe"))

Elastic · ES|QL

Run this as a search.

FROM logs-*| WHERE ((TO_LOWER(file.path) LIKE "*.mdf" OR TO_LOWER(file.path) LIKE "*.ldf" OR TO_LOWER(file.path) LIKE "*.ndf" OR TO_LOWER(file.path) LIKE "*.mdb" OR TO_LOWER(file.path) LIKE "*.accdb" OR TO_LOWER(file.path) LIKE "*.sqlite" OR TO_LOWER(file.path) LIKE "*.sqlite3" OR TO_LOWER(file.path) LIKE "*.db" OR TO_LOWER(file.path) LIKE "*.dbf" OR TO_LOWER(file.path) LIKE "*.gdb" OR TO_LOWER(file.path) LIKE "*.qbw") AND (TO_LOWER(process.executable) LIKE "*\\\\powershell.exe" OR TO_LOWER(process.executable) LIKE "*\\\\pwsh.exe" OR TO_LOWER(process.executable) LIKE "*\\\\cmd.exe" OR TO_LOWER(process.executable) LIKE "*\\\\wscript.exe" OR TO_LOWER(process.executable) LIKE "*\\\\cscript.exe" OR TO_LOWER(process.executable) LIKE "*\\\\mshta.exe" OR TO_LOWER(process.executable) LIKE "*\\\\rundll32.exe" OR TO_LOWER(process.executable) LIKE "*\\\\regsvr32.exe" OR TO_LOWER(process.executable) LIKE "*\\\\certutil.exe" OR TO_LOWER(process.executable) LIKE "*\\\\curl.exe" OR TO_LOWER(process.executable) LIKE "*\\\\python.exe" OR TO_LOWER(process.executable) LIKE "*\\\\pythonw.exe" OR TO_LOWER(process.executable) LIKE "*\\\\notepad.exe"))

Wazuh · XML rule

Deploy to your manager — this is a rule, not a search.

<group name="sigma,windows,file_event,">  <!-- Rule ids must be unique on your manager; 100000+ is the user range. -->  <rule id="100000" level="5">    <!-- Set <if_sid> to the decoder/base rule for windows so this only evaluates relevant events. -->    <field name="TargetFilename" type="pcre2">(?i)(\.mdf$|\.ldf$|\.ndf$|\.mdb$|\.accdb$|\.sqlite$|\.sqlite3$|\.db$|\.dbf$|\.gdb$|\.qbw$)</field>    <field name="Image" type="pcre2">(?i)(\\powershell\.exe$|\\pwsh\.exe$|\\cmd\.exe$|\\wscript\.exe$|\\cscript\.exe$|\\mshta\.exe$|\\rundll32\.exe$|\\regsvr32\.exe$|\\certutil\.exe$|\\curl\.exe$|\\python\.exe$|\\pythonw\.exe$|\\notepad\.exe$)</field>    <description>Database or ledger file created by a script host or LOLBin</description>    <mitre>      <id>T1565</id>    </mitre>  </rule></group>

At a glance

Logsource: file_event / windows
Level: low
Category: impact_destruction
Sigma status: experimental
Backends: 4 of 4 rendered
Updated: 30 Aug 2026
Rule ID: e8c7777d-947b-4c81-b66b-99b383861226

ATT&CKT1565

T1565Data Manipulation

ATT&CK® is a registered trademark of The MITRE Corporation. These mappings are the rule author’s, and are neither reviewed nor endorsed by MITRE.

Lessonimpact destruction

impact destruction

01 · What this rule detects

The work an operator does to make recovery impossible before, or while, destroying data — deleting volume shadow copies, wiping backup catalogs, disabling Windows recovery and boot repair, and deleting or overwriting files recursively. Most of it happens in a short burst immediately before encryption, which is why the precursors are the part worth detecting: by the time file modification volume is the signal, the decision has already been made for you. This overlaps deliberately with log clearing — the same burst usually destroys evidence and recovery together — but keep the two rules apart, because they point at different questions.

02 · Telemetry you need

Process creation with full command lines — Sysmon EventID 1, or Security 4688 with Audit Process Creation and the command-line inclusion policy; without the second policy you see that vssadmin ran and nothing about what it did
The utilities themselves: vssadmin, wmic shadowcopy, wbadmin, bcdedit, cipher, and the PowerShell and WMI equivalents that never touch a command-line binary
Sysmon EventID 23 and 26 (FileDelete and FileDeleteDetected) — not in the default configuration, and the archiving variant needs disk space budgeted for it
Service and provider activity for the Volume Shadow Copy service, and the backup product's own logs, which record deletion the operating system does not
Security 4663 for delete access on protected shares — Audit Object Access plus a SACL, off by default and inert without the SACL

03 · How the logic works

These command lines are short, fixed and close to unique, which makes this one of the few categories where string matching against the command line is the right primary approach rather than a fallback. Structure each as image AND destructive verb: matching vssadmin alone catches every backup product listing shadows, whereas vssadmin with delete does not. Allow for argument reordering, abbreviation and the several spellings of the same operation, and remember that the same effect is reachable through WMI and the COM interfaces without running the utility at all — so a rule set that names only the executables has a hole in it that any competent tooling walks through. The mass-encryption half is a rate problem: file modifications per process per minute, which Sigma cannot express and which belongs in the correlation layer.

04 · Common false positives

Backup software managing its own shadow storage and pruning old copies — Veeam, Acronis, Windows Server Backup and the built-in scheduled tasks
Disk cleanup and storage reclamation removing shadow copies when a volume fills
Imaging, provisioning and task sequences that use bcdedit and reset recovery configuration by design
Non-persistent VDI and lab rebuild workflows that discard machine state on every cycle
Developers and build systems recursively deleting output directories

05 · Detection maturity

Tier 1 — starting point: Matches vssadmin and wbadmin deletion command lines.
Tier 2 — tuned: Covers the WMI and PowerShell routes and boot configuration tampering, with backup hosts and maintenance windows excluded.
Tier 3 — correlated: Correlates recovery destruction with log clearing, service stops and file modification rate from the same host and process tree.

Tuning & false positivesexperimental · 5 declared

experimental (current stage)
test
stable

Written and reasoned about, but not yet run against real telemetry. Expect to tune it before trusting it.

Tuning tips

This should be a near-silent category. If it is noisy, find out what is deleting recovery points routinely and fix that rather than filtering it
Never exclude by account — the accounts used here are administrative by definition, which is the point
Scope exclusions to the specific backup hosts and their maintenance windows, and revisit them when the backup product changes
Alert on failed attempts as well as successful ones; a denied shadow deletion is the same intent and better news
Escalate hard on the combination — shadow deletion, log clearing and service stops from one host inside a few minutes is a different alert from any of them alone

Declared by the author

Developer, build and automation hosts. There, Python and PowerShell create .db and .sqlite files as a matter of routine and this is the highest-volume match by a wide margin across the whole rule.
Backup, restore and migration windows: a scripted restore lays down .mdf and .ldf under a service account, and curl or PowerShell staging an .accdb or .mdb copy before a cutover matches the same way.
Endpoint protection and backup agents that quarantine and recreate a live store in place during on-access scanning, where the recreate step runs through a PowerShell or cmd wrapper rather than the agent binary itself.
Reporting and ETL jobs that regenerate an Access or dBase extract on a schedule for finance or BI teams, writing the file through cscript.exe or PowerShell on every cycle.
Application installers and first-run setup that seed an empty SQLite or Access store for a line-of-business tool, unpacked by a script wrapper rather than by the application itself.

Noise check0 of 3 fired

Fires on none of the 3 ordinary behaviours the baseline holds for this log type. That is not a precision guarantee: it means only not caught by these 3 behaviours, and the next ordinary behaviour nobody wrote down may still match.

Run live against 65 hand-written events of ordinary corporate activity — backup agents, software distribution, patching, helpdesk scripts, EDR. It says nothing about how often the rule would fire in production, which is the number that actually exhausts an analyst.

Verification1 run

Not verified

Siemphony benign baseline
completed
Siemphony IR · 3 Sept 2026
No events matched, so this run proves nothing either way.

Test it yourselfin your browser

Runs here in your browser against public attack recordings. A preview — not the verification badge.

Recordings of T1565, evaluated against their file_event events.

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Database or ledger file created by a script host or LOLBin

The detection

detection.yml

Sentinel · KQL

Splunk · SPL

Elastic · ES|QL

Wazuh · XML rule

Community

Verdicts from engineers who deployed it