Bandwidth monetisation client executed on a Linux host

Siemphony@siemphonymediumT1496.002unverified

Catches the launch of a client that sells the host's bandwidth and IP address to a proxyware service — the proxyjacking behaviour named in the technique — because the sustained data rate AN0081 really describes is a threshold over time that Sigma cannot express. The same strings are matched against both the command line and the binary path: these clients ship as native binaries under /opt or /usr/local/bin and as container images, so the brand string survives in argv either way, while the Image arm keeps the rule alive on a feed that carries exe= but no arguments at all. That second arm is not optional, because auditd's SYSCALL record holds only exe=, comm= and the syscall arguments — argv arrives in a separate EXECVE record where arguments containing spaces or quotes are hex-encoded and long ones are split into chunks — so this rule needs auditd with an execve rule loaded (no mainstream distribution ships one) AND a collector that reassembles and hex-decodes EXECVE argv; without the second, the command-line arm returns zero forever, and zero rows reads as quiet when it means blind. MITRE's ToolPattern knob names proxychains and 3proxy, both matched below; the proxyware brand list is authored here, carries the date it was last refreshed, and is the part that ages fastest, so a quiet result is weak evidence of absence. The ceiling is low by construction — renaming the binary or retagging the container image defeats the rule entirely, so it finds unsophisticated proxyjacking only, and the botnet, torrent-seeding and internet-scanning behaviours the technique also covers need the sustained-egress network leg this log source cannot aggregate. UNVERIFIED AS AUTHORED — derived from MITRE ATT&CK DET0028, not hand-written and not tested by its author. Any lab result is on this rule's own page.Full description

The 4 SIEM queries below are previews produced by Siemphony’s own translator, not pySigma, and none has been executed against a real backend — review before you deploy.

detection.yml

Sentinel · KQL

Run this as a search.

DeviceProcessEvents| where ((ProcessCommandLine contains "proxychains" or ProcessCommandLine contains "3proxy" or ProcessCommandLine contains "honeygain" or ProcessCommandLine contains "earnapp" or ProcessCommandLine contains "traffmonetizer" or ProcessCommandLine contains "peer2profit" or ProcessCommandLine contains "packetstream" or ProcessCommandLine contains "packetshare" or ProcessCommandLine contains "repocket" or ProcessCommandLine contains "proxyrack" or ProcessCommandLine contains "pawns-cli" or ProcessCommandLine contains "iproyal" or ProcessCommandLine contains "bitping" or ProcessCommandLine contains "nodepay" or ProcessCommandLine contains "getgrass" or ProcessCommandLine contains "earnfm" or ProcessCommandLine contains "mysterium" or ProcessCommandLine contains "proxylite" or ProcessCommandLine contains "9hits" or ProcessCommandLine contains "speedshare" or ProcessCommandLine contains "luminati" or ProcessCommandLine contains "brightdata") or (FolderPath contains "proxychains" or FolderPath contains "3proxy" or FolderPath contains "honeygain" or FolderPath contains "earnapp" or FolderPath contains "traffmonetizer" or FolderPath contains "peer2profit" or FolderPath contains "packetstream" or FolderPath contains "packetshare" or FolderPath contains "repocket" or FolderPath contains "proxyrack" or FolderPath contains "pawns-cli" or FolderPath contains "iproyal" or FolderPath contains "bitping" or FolderPath contains "nodepay" or FolderPath contains "getgrass" or FolderPath contains "earnfm" or FolderPath contains "mysterium" or FolderPath contains "proxylite" or FolderPath contains "9hits" or FolderPath contains "speedshare" or FolderPath contains "luminati" or FolderPath contains "brightdata"))

Splunk · SPL

Run this as a search.

index=* ((CommandLine="*proxychains*" OR CommandLine="*3proxy*" OR CommandLine="*honeygain*" OR CommandLine="*earnapp*" OR CommandLine="*traffmonetizer*" OR CommandLine="*peer2profit*" OR CommandLine="*packetstream*" OR CommandLine="*packetshare*" OR CommandLine="*repocket*" OR CommandLine="*proxyrack*" OR CommandLine="*pawns-cli*" OR CommandLine="*iproyal*" OR CommandLine="*bitping*" OR CommandLine="*nodepay*" OR CommandLine="*getgrass*" OR CommandLine="*earnfm*" OR CommandLine="*mysterium*" OR CommandLine="*proxylite*" OR CommandLine="*9hits*" OR CommandLine="*speedshare*" OR CommandLine="*luminati*" OR CommandLine="*brightdata*") OR (Image="*proxychains*" OR Image="*3proxy*" OR Image="*honeygain*" OR Image="*earnapp*" OR Image="*traffmonetizer*" OR Image="*peer2profit*" OR Image="*packetstream*" OR Image="*packetshare*" OR Image="*repocket*" OR Image="*proxyrack*" OR Image="*pawns-cli*" OR Image="*iproyal*" OR Image="*bitping*" OR Image="*nodepay*" OR Image="*getgrass*" OR Image="*earnfm*" OR Image="*mysterium*" OR Image="*proxylite*" OR Image="*9hits*" OR Image="*speedshare*" OR Image="*luminati*" OR Image="*brightdata*"))

Elastic · ES|QL

Run this as a search.

FROM logs-*| WHERE ((TO_LOWER(process.command_line) LIKE "*proxychains*" OR TO_LOWER(process.command_line) LIKE "*3proxy*" OR TO_LOWER(process.command_line) LIKE "*honeygain*" OR TO_LOWER(process.command_line) LIKE "*earnapp*" OR TO_LOWER(process.command_line) LIKE "*traffmonetizer*" OR TO_LOWER(process.command_line) LIKE "*peer2profit*" OR TO_LOWER(process.command_line) LIKE "*packetstream*" OR TO_LOWER(process.command_line) LIKE "*packetshare*" OR TO_LOWER(process.command_line) LIKE "*repocket*" OR TO_LOWER(process.command_line) LIKE "*proxyrack*" OR TO_LOWER(process.command_line) LIKE "*pawns-cli*" OR TO_LOWER(process.command_line) LIKE "*iproyal*" OR TO_LOWER(process.command_line) LIKE "*bitping*" OR TO_LOWER(process.command_line) LIKE "*nodepay*" OR TO_LOWER(process.command_line) LIKE "*getgrass*" OR TO_LOWER(process.command_line) LIKE "*earnfm*" OR TO_LOWER(process.command_line) LIKE "*mysterium*" OR TO_LOWER(process.command_line) LIKE "*proxylite*" OR TO_LOWER(process.command_line) LIKE "*9hits*" OR TO_LOWER(process.command_line) LIKE "*speedshare*" OR TO_LOWER(process.command_line) LIKE "*luminati*" OR TO_LOWER(process.command_line) LIKE "*brightdata*") OR (TO_LOWER(process.executable) LIKE "*proxychains*" OR TO_LOWER(process.executable) LIKE "*3proxy*" OR TO_LOWER(process.executable) LIKE "*honeygain*" OR TO_LOWER(process.executable) LIKE "*earnapp*" OR TO_LOWER(process.executable) LIKE "*traffmonetizer*" OR TO_LOWER(process.executable) LIKE "*peer2profit*" OR TO_LOWER(process.executable) LIKE "*packetstream*" OR TO_LOWER(process.executable) LIKE "*packetshare*" OR TO_LOWER(process.executable) LIKE "*repocket*" OR TO_LOWER(process.executable) LIKE "*proxyrack*" OR TO_LOWER(process.executable) LIKE "*pawns-cli*" OR TO_LOWER(process.executable) LIKE "*iproyal*" OR TO_LOWER(process.executable) LIKE "*bitping*" OR TO_LOWER(process.executable) LIKE "*nodepay*" OR TO_LOWER(process.executable) LIKE "*getgrass*" OR TO_LOWER(process.executable) LIKE "*earnfm*" OR TO_LOWER(process.executable) LIKE "*mysterium*" OR TO_LOWER(process.executable) LIKE "*proxylite*" OR TO_LOWER(process.executable) LIKE "*9hits*" OR TO_LOWER(process.executable) LIKE "*speedshare*" OR TO_LOWER(process.executable) LIKE "*luminati*" OR TO_LOWER(process.executable) LIKE "*brightdata*"))

Wazuh · XML rule

Deploy to your manager — this is a rule, not a search.

<group name="sigma,linux,process_creation,">  <!-- Rule ids must be unique on your manager; 100000+ is the user range. -->  <!-- 2 rules: the Sigma condition ORs across different fields,       which one rule cannot express. Any one matching is a hit. -->  <rule id="100000" level="7">    <!-- Set <if_sid> to the decoder/base rule for linux so this only evaluates relevant events. -->    <field name="CommandLine" type="pcre2">(?i)(proxychains|3proxy|honeygain|earnapp|traffmonetizer|peer2profit|packetstream|packetshare|repocket|proxyrack|pawns-cli|iproyal|bitping|nodepay|getgrass|earnfm|mysterium|proxylite|9hits|speedshare|luminati|brightdata)</field>    <description>Bandwidth monetisation client executed on a Linux host (1/2)</description>    <mitre>      <id>T1496.002</id>    </mitre>  </rule>   <rule id="100001" level="7">    <!-- Set <if_sid> to the decoder/base rule for linux so this only evaluates relevant events. -->    <field name="Image" type="pcre2">(?i)(proxychains|3proxy|honeygain|earnapp|traffmonetizer|peer2profit|packetstream|packetshare|repocket|proxyrack|pawns-cli|iproyal|bitping|nodepay|getgrass|earnfm|mysterium|proxylite|9hits|speedshare|luminati|brightdata)</field>    <description>Bandwidth monetisation client executed on a Linux host (2/2)</description>    <mitre>      <id>T1496.002</id>    </mitre>  </rule></group>

At a glance

Logsource: process_creation / linux
Level: medium
Category: impact_destruction
Sigma status: experimental
Backends: 4 of 4 rendered
Updated: 30 Aug 2026
Rule ID: 878e6aa4-903d-49b4-85ce-9a69a19f6374

ATT&CKT1496.002

T1496.002Bandwidth Hijacking

ATT&CK® is a registered trademark of The MITRE Corporation. These mappings are the rule author’s, and are neither reviewed nor endorsed by MITRE.

Lessonimpact destruction

impact destruction

01 · What this rule detects

The work an operator does to make recovery impossible before, or while, destroying data — deleting volume shadow copies, wiping backup catalogs, disabling Windows recovery and boot repair, and deleting or overwriting files recursively. Most of it happens in a short burst immediately before encryption, which is why the precursors are the part worth detecting: by the time file modification volume is the signal, the decision has already been made for you. This overlaps deliberately with log clearing — the same burst usually destroys evidence and recovery together — but keep the two rules apart, because they point at different questions.

02 · Telemetry you need

Process creation with full command lines — Sysmon EventID 1, or Security 4688 with Audit Process Creation and the command-line inclusion policy; without the second policy you see that vssadmin ran and nothing about what it did
The utilities themselves: vssadmin, wmic shadowcopy, wbadmin, bcdedit, cipher, and the PowerShell and WMI equivalents that never touch a command-line binary
Sysmon EventID 23 and 26 (FileDelete and FileDeleteDetected) — not in the default configuration, and the archiving variant needs disk space budgeted for it
Service and provider activity for the Volume Shadow Copy service, and the backup product's own logs, which record deletion the operating system does not
Security 4663 for delete access on protected shares — Audit Object Access plus a SACL, off by default and inert without the SACL

03 · How the logic works

These command lines are short, fixed and close to unique, which makes this one of the few categories where string matching against the command line is the right primary approach rather than a fallback. Structure each as image AND destructive verb: matching vssadmin alone catches every backup product listing shadows, whereas vssadmin with delete does not. Allow for argument reordering, abbreviation and the several spellings of the same operation, and remember that the same effect is reachable through WMI and the COM interfaces without running the utility at all — so a rule set that names only the executables has a hole in it that any competent tooling walks through. The mass-encryption half is a rate problem: file modifications per process per minute, which Sigma cannot express and which belongs in the correlation layer.

04 · Common false positives

Backup software managing its own shadow storage and pruning old copies — Veeam, Acronis, Windows Server Backup and the built-in scheduled tasks
Disk cleanup and storage reclamation removing shadow copies when a volume fills
Imaging, provisioning and task sequences that use bcdedit and reset recovery configuration by design
Non-persistent VDI and lab rebuild workflows that discard machine state on every cycle
Developers and build systems recursively deleting output directories

05 · Detection maturity

Tier 1 — starting point: Matches vssadmin and wbadmin deletion command lines.
Tier 2 — tuned: Covers the WMI and PowerShell routes and boot configuration tampering, with backup hosts and maintenance windows excluded.
Tier 3 — correlated: Correlates recovery destruction with log clearing, service stops and file modification rate from the same host and process tree.

Tuning & false positivesexperimental · 5 declared

experimental (current stage)
test
stable

Written and reasoned about, but not yet run against real telemetry. Expect to tune it before trusting it.

Tuning tips

This should be a near-silent category. If it is noisy, find out what is deleting recovery points routinely and fix that rather than filtering it
Never exclude by account — the accounts used here are administrative by definition, which is the point
Scope exclusions to the specific backup hosts and their maintenance windows, and revisit them when the backup product changes
Alert on failed attempts as well as successful ones; a denied shadow deletion is the same intent and better news
Escalate hard on the combination — shadow deletion, log clearing and service stops from one host inside a few minutes is a different alert from any of them alone

Declared by the author

Administrators, penetration testers and authorised red teams running proxychains to route a tool through a jump host, or 3proxy as a sanctioned internal proxy, which is the intended use of both tools MITRE's ToolPattern knob names.
Consumer-grade endpoints in BYOD or lab subnets where free VPN, free-internet and tethering apps bundle a proxyware SDK under these same brand strings. This is unsanctioned rather than adversary activity and will dominate hits in any estate with unmanaged Linux hosts.
Organisations that legitimately buy residential proxy or web-scraping capacity. Fraud, brand-protection and threat-intelligence teams run these same clients under contract, and the execve record of a sanctioned deployment is identical to that of a hijacked host.
Any command line that merely mentions a brand name without running the client — a package manager installing or removing it, a container image being pulled or tagged, an incident-response grep, or a configuration-management run that enforces its absence.
Employees monetising an idle machine for personal income, which is a true positive for the technique but normally an acceptable-use matter rather than an intrusion, and which will account for most hits in a permissive environment.

Noise check0 of 4 fired

Fires on none of the 4 ordinary behaviours the baseline holds for this log type. That is not a precision guarantee: it means only not caught by these 4 behaviours, and the next ordinary behaviour nobody wrote down may still match.

Run live against 65 hand-written events of ordinary corporate activity — backup agents, software distribution, patching, helpdesk scripts, EDR. It says nothing about how often the rule would fire in production, which is the number that actually exhausts an analyst.

Verification1 run

Not verified

Siemphony benign baseline
completed
Siemphony IR · 3 Sept 2026
No events matched, so this run proves nothing either way.

Test it yourselfin your browser

Runs here in your browser against public attack recordings. A preview — not the verification badge.

Recordings of T1496.002, evaluated against their process_creation events.

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Bandwidth monetisation client executed on a Linux host

The detection

detection.yml

Sentinel · KQL

Splunk · SPL

Elastic · ES|QL

Wazuh · XML rule

Community

Verdicts from engineers who deployed it