clip.exe launched by a one-shot shell, script or service

Siemphony@siemphonylowT1115unverified

Matches AN0965's Windows observable in two arms. The first is the one the analytic's own CISA AA21-200B citation describes: clip.exe spawned by a shell that was itself launched to run a single command — `cmd.exe /c ... | clip` or `powershell -Command ... | clip` — recognised through ParentCommandLine rather than through ParentImage, because the parent of clip.exe is the invoking shell whether a human typed the pipeline or an implant spawned it. Excluding cmd.exe and powershell.exe as parents outright, which an earlier draft did, removed the most common real-world invocation of this technique rather than removing noise. The second arm is the analytic's literal claim about parentage: clip.exe with a parent that is not a shell or the desktop shell at all — a service, a scheduled task engine, an Office application, a remote-access agent. WindowsTerminal.exe is deliberately not treated as an interactive parent, because inside a Windows Terminal session the parent of clip.exe is the shell hosted in the tab, not the terminal process. clip.exe only writes stdin to the clipboard, so the binary alone is a poor collection signal and neither arm claims otherwise. PowerShell's Get-Clipboard cmdlet, the other Windows observable MITRE names, leaves no distinct trace on process_creation because it runs inside an already-launched powershell.exe host and needs Script Block Logging to show up at all, so it is deliberately left out rather than folded into a cross-field OR; a binary calling OpenClipboard/GetClipboardData directly is invisible here for the same reason. AN0965's TimeWindow and follow-on network correlation — clipboard read chained to staging or exfiltration — is not modelled; Sigma has no event join for it. UNVERIFIED AS AUTHORED — derived from MITRE ATT&CK DET0341, not hand-written and not tested by its author. Any lab result is on this rule's own page.Full description

The 4 SIEM queries below are previews produced by Siemphony’s own translator, not pySigma, and none has been executed against a real backend — review before you deploy.

detection.yml

Sentinel · KQL

Run this as a search.

DeviceProcessEvents| where (FolderPath endswith "\\clip.exe" and (((InitiatingProcessFolderPath endswith "\\cmd.exe" or InitiatingProcessFolderPath endswith "\\powershell.exe" or InitiatingProcessFolderPath endswith "\\pwsh.exe") and (InitiatingProcessCommandLine contains "-c " or InitiatingProcessCommandLine contains "/c " or InitiatingProcessCommandLine contains "–c " or InitiatingProcessCommandLine contains "—c " or InitiatingProcessCommandLine contains "―c " or InitiatingProcessCommandLine contains "-command" or InitiatingProcessCommandLine contains "/command" or InitiatingProcessCommandLine contains "–command" or InitiatingProcessCommandLine contains "—command" or InitiatingProcessCommandLine contains "―command" or InitiatingProcessCommandLine contains "-encodedcommand" or InitiatingProcessCommandLine contains "/encodedcommand" or InitiatingProcessCommandLine contains "–encodedcommand" or InitiatingProcessCommandLine contains "—encodedcommand" or InitiatingProcessCommandLine contains "―encodedcommand" or InitiatingProcessCommandLine contains "-enc " or InitiatingProcessCommandLine contains "/enc " or InitiatingProcessCommandLine contains "–enc " or InitiatingProcessCommandLine contains "—enc " or InitiatingProcessCommandLine contains "―enc ")) or not ((InitiatingProcessFolderPath endswith "\\explorer.exe" or InitiatingProcessFolderPath endswith "\\cmd.exe" or InitiatingProcessFolderPath endswith "\\powershell.exe" or InitiatingProcessFolderPath endswith "\\pwsh.exe"))))

Splunk · SPL

Run this as a search.

index=* (Image="*\\clip.exe" AND (((ParentImage="*\\cmd.exe" OR ParentImage="*\\powershell.exe" OR ParentImage="*\\pwsh.exe") AND (ParentCommandLine="*-c *" OR ParentCommandLine="*/c *" OR ParentCommandLine="*–c *" OR ParentCommandLine="*—c *" OR ParentCommandLine="*―c *" OR ParentCommandLine="*-command*" OR ParentCommandLine="*/command*" OR ParentCommandLine="*–command*" OR ParentCommandLine="*—command*" OR ParentCommandLine="*―command*" OR ParentCommandLine="*-encodedcommand*" OR ParentCommandLine="*/encodedcommand*" OR ParentCommandLine="*–encodedcommand*" OR ParentCommandLine="*—encodedcommand*" OR ParentCommandLine="*―encodedcommand*" OR ParentCommandLine="*-enc *" OR ParentCommandLine="*/enc *" OR ParentCommandLine="*–enc *" OR ParentCommandLine="*—enc *" OR ParentCommandLine="*―enc *")) OR NOT ((ParentImage="*\\explorer.exe" OR ParentImage="*\\cmd.exe" OR ParentImage="*\\powershell.exe" OR ParentImage="*\\pwsh.exe"))))

Elastic · ES|QL

Run this as a search.

FROM logs-*| WHERE (TO_LOWER(process.executable) LIKE "*\\\\clip.exe" AND (((TO_LOWER(process.parent.executable) LIKE "*\\\\cmd.exe" OR TO_LOWER(process.parent.executable) LIKE "*\\\\powershell.exe" OR TO_LOWER(process.parent.executable) LIKE "*\\\\pwsh.exe") AND (TO_LOWER(process.parent.command_line) LIKE "*-c *" OR TO_LOWER(process.parent.command_line) LIKE "*/c *" OR TO_LOWER(process.parent.command_line) LIKE "*–c *" OR TO_LOWER(process.parent.command_line) LIKE "*—c *" OR TO_LOWER(process.parent.command_line) LIKE "*―c *" OR TO_LOWER(process.parent.command_line) LIKE "*-command*" OR TO_LOWER(process.parent.command_line) LIKE "*/command*" OR TO_LOWER(process.parent.command_line) LIKE "*–command*" OR TO_LOWER(process.parent.command_line) LIKE "*—command*" OR TO_LOWER(process.parent.command_line) LIKE "*―command*" OR TO_LOWER(process.parent.command_line) LIKE "*-encodedcommand*" OR TO_LOWER(process.parent.command_line) LIKE "*/encodedcommand*" OR TO_LOWER(process.parent.command_line) LIKE "*–encodedcommand*" OR TO_LOWER(process.parent.command_line) LIKE "*—encodedcommand*" OR TO_LOWER(process.parent.command_line) LIKE "*―encodedcommand*" OR TO_LOWER(process.parent.command_line) LIKE "*-enc *" OR TO_LOWER(process.parent.command_line) LIKE "*/enc *" OR TO_LOWER(process.parent.command_line) LIKE "*–enc *" OR TO_LOWER(process.parent.command_line) LIKE "*—enc *" OR TO_LOWER(process.parent.command_line) LIKE "*―enc *")) OR NOT ((TO_LOWER(process.parent.executable) LIKE "*\\\\explorer.exe" OR TO_LOWER(process.parent.executable) LIKE "*\\\\cmd.exe" OR TO_LOWER(process.parent.executable) LIKE "*\\\\powershell.exe" OR TO_LOWER(process.parent.executable) LIKE "*\\\\pwsh.exe"))))

Wazuh · XML rule

Deploy to your manager — this is a rule, not a search.

<group name="sigma,windows,process_creation,">  <!-- Rule ids must be unique on your manager; 100000+ is the user range. -->  <!-- 2 rules: the Sigma condition ORs across different fields,       which one rule cannot express. Any one matching is a hit. -->  <rule id="100000" level="5">    <!-- Set <if_sid> to the decoder/base rule for windows so this only evaluates relevant events. -->    <field name="Image" type="pcre2">(?i)\\clip\.exe$</field>    <field name="ParentImage" type="pcre2">(?i)(\\cmd\.exe$|\\powershell\.exe$|\\pwsh\.exe$)</field>    <field name="ParentCommandLine" type="pcre2">(?i)(-c |/c |–c |—c |―c |-command|/command|–command|—command|―command|-encodedcommand|/encodedcommand|–encodedcommand|—encodedcommand|―encodedcommand|-enc |/enc |–enc |—enc |―enc )</field>    <description>clip.exe launched by a one-shot shell, script or service (1/2)</description>    <mitre>      <id>T1115</id>    </mitre>  </rule>   <rule id="100001" level="5">    <!-- Set <if_sid> to the decoder/base rule for windows so this only evaluates relevant events. -->    <field name="Image" type="pcre2">(?i)\\clip\.exe$</field>    <field name="ParentImage" negate="yes" type="pcre2">(?i)(\\explorer\.exe$|\\cmd\.exe$|\\powershell\.exe$|\\pwsh\.exe$)</field>    <description>clip.exe launched by a one-shot shell, script or service (2/2)</description>    <mitre>      <id>T1115</id>    </mitre>  </rule></group>

At a glance

Logsource: process_creation / windows
Level: low
Category: data_staging_exfil
Sigma status: experimental
Backends: 4 of 4 rendered
Updated: 30 Aug 2026
Rule ID: 03cadd3a-321b-46db-a0c3-a387c29971c7

ATT&CKT1115

T1115Clipboard Data

ATT&CK® is a registered trademark of The MITRE Corporation. These mappings are the rule author’s, and are neither reviewed nor endorsed by MITRE.

Lessondata staging exfil

data staging exfil

01 · What this rule detects

Collection before departure: files gathered from profiles and shares, compressed — often into a password-protected archive — dropped into a staging directory, and then moved out of the environment. The staging half is the reliably detectable half, and it usually happens close enough to the transfer that catching it still leaves time to act.

02 · Telemetry you need

Process creation with full command lines for archiving utilities — 7z, rar, WinRAR's console build, tar.exe, makecab, and PowerShell Compress-Archive; the switches are the interesting part, so a truncated command line is worthless here
Sysmon EventID 11 (FileCreate) for archive extensions written under Temp, ProgramData, Public and the recycle bin
Sysmon EventID 3 (NetworkConnect) with DestinationIp, DestinationHostname, DestinationPort and Initiated, tied to the uploading process
Proxy, firewall or flow logs with bytes sent per session — these are the only records that carry volume and direction, and neither Sysmon nor the Security log has them
Security 5145 (detailed file share access) and 4663 (object access) for reads across shares — 5145 requires Audit Detailed File Share, 4663 requires Audit Object Access plus a SACL on the data itself, and all of it is off by default
DNS query logs, for the cloud storage and tunnelling destinations the transfer half resolves

03 · How the logic works

Split this into two rules, because it is really two behaviours with different telemetry. The staging rule is a process rule: an archiving utility invoked with a recursion switch, an output path under a staging directory, or a password flag, over a source path that holds user data or share content. Anchor on the switches and the paths rather than the tool name — a renamed rar.exe still needs the same arguments to do the same job — and keep the password flag as its own higher-severity condition, since ordinary backup rarely needs one. The transfer rule is a volume and destination rule, and it does not express well in Sigma: there is no aggregation, so the bytes-sent threshold and the per-destination grouping live in the backend query or the correlation layer. The pairing that makes both worth having is sequence — an archive created, then that same file opened by a process that immediately connects outbound.

04 · Common false positives

Backup and archiving agents doing precisely this by design, including Veeam, Acronis and Windows Server Backup
Sanctioned cloud sync clients — OneDrive, Dropbox, Box — moving large volumes to destinations that are supposed to receive them
Developers and build agents compressing source trees, artefacts and logs, and CI runners uploading them
IT collecting diagnostic bundles and log archives for a vendor support case
E-discovery, DLP and data-classification scanners reading broadly across shares, and migration tooling moving mailboxes or file servers

05 · Detection maturity

Tier 1 — starting point: Matches archiving utility command lines by tool name.
Tier 2 — tuned: Matches recursion and password switches over sensitive source paths, with backup and sync clients excluded by signed path.
Tier 3 — correlated: Correlates archive creation with the subsequent read and outbound transfer of that file, scored on destination novelty and volume.

Tuning & false positivesexperimental · 4 declared

experimental (current stage)
test
stable

Written and reasoned about, but not yet run against real telemetry. Expect to tune it before trusting it.

Tuning tips

Password-protected archives of user data are the highest-payoff single condition in this category; alert on those before anything else
Scope the staging rule by source path — profile directories and file shares — rather than by the utility, so unfamiliar tools still match
Exclude sanctioned cloud sync by the signed path of the client process, not by destination domain, or you excuse anything that can reach the same domain
Keep staging and transfer as separate alerts so each stays actionable, and correlate them for severity rather than merging them into one rule
Where the archive is written matters more than what wrote it: a user-writable staging directory holding an archive of someone else's data is the shape you are looking for

Declared by the author

Administrators, support technicians and build scripts piping command output straight to the clipboard from a one-shot shell — cmd /c ipconfig /all | clip is a documented habit and matches the first arm exactly, which makes it the highest-volume benign source anywhere clip.exe is used at all.
RDP, Citrix and other VDI clipboard-redirection agents, which shell out to clip.exe from their own redirection service rather than from a user's shell to synchronise host and client clipboards — in any environment with remote-desktop clipboard sync enabled this dominates the second arm.
Remote-support tools (TeamViewer, AnyDesk and similar) invoking clip.exe from a background service process as part of session clipboard sharing.
Scheduled tasks and logon scripts, launched by the Task Scheduler engine rather than an interactive shell, that pipe command output through clip.exe for a technician to paste into a report.

Noise check0 of 30 fired

Fires on none of the 30 ordinary behaviours the baseline holds for this log type. That is not a precision guarantee: it means only not caught by these 30 behaviours, and the next ordinary behaviour nobody wrote down may still match.

Run live against 65 hand-written events of ordinary corporate activity — backup agents, software distribution, patching, helpdesk scripts, EDR. It says nothing about how often the rule would fire in production, which is the number that actually exhausts an analyst.

Verification1 run

Not verified

Siemphony benign baseline
completed
Siemphony IR · 3 Sept 2026
No events matched, so this run proves nothing either way.

Test it yourselfin your browser

Runs here in your browser against public attack recordings. A preview — not the verification badge.

Recordings of T1115, evaluated against their process_creation events.

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clip.exe launched by a one-shot shell, script or service

The detection

detection.yml

Sentinel · KQL

Splunk · SPL

Elastic · ES|QL

Wazuh · XML rule

Community

Verdicts from engineers who deployed it