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Network provider DLL registered in the registry

Registering a network provider is how NPPSPY-style credential capture is installed: mpnotify.exe hands every interactive and domain logon's cleartext password to each registered provider, so the registration itself is the earliest and cheapest thing to watch. Two writes make a provider real, and this rule is one selection for each. The first is `ProviderPath` under a service's `NetworkProvider` subkey, which names the DLL that will receive credentials — an event is kept only when the value written does not point into System32 or SysWOW64, because every provider Windows ships (ntlanman.dll, drprov.dll, davclnt.dll) lives there. The second is a write to `ProviderOrder` under `Control\NetworkProvider\Order` or its `HwOrder` twin, the ordered list a provider's service name has to be added to before Windows will load it; that leg carries no path to filter on, so it matches every rewrite of the list. This addresses MITRE's `MonitoredRegistryKeys` and `SuspiciousDLLPaths` knobs, populated here with the two key paths above and with System32/SysWOW64 as the expected-location set — MITRE names the knobs, the values are authored. Three limits are worth stating. A DLL dropped into System32 before it is registered defeats the path filter entirely, and is caught only if the operator also rewrites `ProviderOrder`; that is the main reason the order leg is kept despite being the noisier of the two. AN1598's other three arms are not attempted here — its Sysmon EventID 11 file-creation, EventID 7 module-load and EventID 10 process-access legs are separate log sources, and its `TimeWindow` knob asks for the registry write, the DLL creation and the subsequent load during logon to be correlated, which needs a cross-event join and a timeframe that Sigma models neither of. And this rule is written in the Sysmon EventID 13 vocabulary (`TargetObject`, `Details`), which is the vocabulary Sigma's `registry_set` category is shaped around; the brief maps Security EventID 4657 onto that category, but 4657 splits the key and the value name into `ObjectName` and `ObjectValueName` and carries the data in `ObjectValue`, so an estate collecting 4657 needs those fields mapped onto `TargetObject` and `Details` before this rule can match at all — turning on *Audit Registry* and the SACL will not by itself make it fire. On the Sysmon side, registry events are not collected by a bare Sysmon install and several widely used configurations filter the registry down to a short include list, so confirm `Control\NetworkProvider` and `Services\*\NetworkProvider` are in the running config before treating a quiet result as a clean one. UNVERIFIED AS AUTHORED — derived from MITRE ATT&CK DET0580, not hand-written and not tested by its author. Any lab result is on this rule's own page.Full description

The detection

The 4 SIEM queries below are previews produced by Siemphony’s own translator, not pySigma, and none has been executed against a real backend — review before you deploy.

detection.yml

title: Network provider DLL registered in the registryid: f83b287a-4df6-47ef-b348-01eb9bcc01a1status: experimentaldescription: |  Registering a network provider is how NPPSPY-style credential capture is  installed: mpnotify.exe hands every interactive and domain logon's cleartext  password to each registered provider, so the registration itself is the  earliest and cheapest thing to watch. Two writes make a provider real, and  this rule is one selection for each. The first is `ProviderPath` under a  service's `NetworkProvider` subkey, which names the DLL that will receive  credentials — an event is kept only when the value written does not point into  System32 or SysWOW64, because every provider Windows ships (ntlanman.dll,  drprov.dll, davclnt.dll) lives there. The second is a write to `ProviderOrder`  under `Control\NetworkProvider\Order` or its `HwOrder` twin, the ordered list a  provider's service name has to be added to before Windows will load it; that  leg carries no path to filter on, so it matches every rewrite of the list.  This addresses MITRE's `MonitoredRegistryKeys` and `SuspiciousDLLPaths` knobs,  populated here with the two key paths above and with System32/SysWOW64 as the  expected-location set — MITRE names the knobs, the values are authored.  Three limits are worth stating. A DLL dropped into System32 before it is  registered defeats the path filter entirely, and is caught only if the  operator also rewrites `ProviderOrder`; that is the main reason the order leg  is kept despite being the noisier of the two. AN1598's other three arms are  not attempted here — its Sysmon EventID 11 file-creation, EventID 7 module-load  and EventID 10 process-access legs are separate log sources, and its  `TimeWindow` knob asks for the registry write, the DLL creation and the  subsequent load during logon to be correlated, which needs a cross-event join  and a timeframe that Sigma models neither of. And this rule is written in the  Sysmon EventID 13 vocabulary (`TargetObject`, `Details`), which is the  vocabulary Sigma's `registry_set` category is shaped around; the brief maps  Security EventID 4657 onto that category, but 4657 splits the key and the value  name into `ObjectName` and `ObjectValueName` and carries the data in  `ObjectValue`, so an estate collecting 4657 needs those fields mapped onto  `TargetObject` and `Details` before this rule can match at all — turning on  *Audit Registry* and the SACL will not by itself make it fire. On the Sysmon  side, registry events are not collected by a bare Sysmon install and several  widely used configurations filter the registry down to a short include list,  so confirm `Control\NetworkProvider` and `Services\*\NetworkProvider` are in  the running config before treating a quiet result as a clean one.  UNVERIFIED AS AUTHORED — derived from MITRE ATT&CK DET0580, not hand-written and not tested by its author. Any lab result is on this rule's own page.references:  - https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1556/008  - https://attack.mitre.org/detectionstrategies/DET0580author: Siemphony pipeline (machine-derived from MITRE ATT&CK v19.2)date: 2026-08-16tags:  - attack.credential-access  - attack.defense-evasion  - attack.persistence  - attack.t1556.008logsource:  category: registry_set  product: windowsdetection:  selection_provider_path:    TargetObject|endswith: '\NetworkProvider\ProviderPath'  filter_system_dll:    Details|contains:      - '\System32\'      - '\SysWOW64\'  selection_provider_order:    TargetObject|endswith:      - '\NetworkProvider\Order\ProviderOrder'      - '\NetworkProvider\HwOrder\ProviderOrder'  condition: (selection_provider_path and not filter_system_dll) or selection_provider_orderfalsepositives:  - "Installation and upgrade of software that ships its own network provider. VPN and remote-access clients, virtual desktop agents such as Citrix Workspace and VMware Horizon, DFS and network-drive tools, and older NetWare or Micro Focus clients all write a ProviderPath under Program Files and insert their service name into ProviderOrder. This is the loudest match this rule has, it arrives estate-wide in bursts during a deployment or an agent upgrade wave, and it is why the level sits at medium rather than high."  - "Machine build, imaging and sysprep. A task sequence that installs the standard agent set rewrites ProviderOrder once per product per build, so every newly provisioned host produces several matches under a task-sequence process rather than an interactive shell."  - "Windows feature and role changes that add or remove a provider, such as enabling or disabling the WebClient/WebDAV service or the Remote Desktop client components, which rewrite the order list without any DLL being introduced."  - "Repair, reinstall and rollback flows for an already-installed client, including MSI self-repair and endpoint tooling that reasserts its configuration on a schedule, each of which rewrites the same values it wrote at install time."level: medium

Sentinel · KQL

Run this as a search.

DeviceRegistryEvents| where ((RegistryKey endswith "\\NetworkProvider\\ProviderPath" and not ((RegistryValueData contains "\\System32\\" or RegistryValueData contains "\\SysWOW64\\"))) or (RegistryKey endswith "\\NetworkProvider\\Order\\ProviderOrder" or RegistryKey endswith "\\NetworkProvider\\HwOrder\\ProviderOrder"))

Splunk · SPL

Run this as a search.

index=* ((TargetObject="*\\NetworkProvider\\ProviderPath" AND NOT ((Details="*\\System32\\*" OR Details="*\\SysWOW64\\*"))) OR (TargetObject="*\\NetworkProvider\\Order\\ProviderOrder" OR TargetObject="*\\NetworkProvider\\HwOrder\\ProviderOrder"))

Elastic · ES|QL

Run this as a search.

FROM logs-*| WHERE ((TO_LOWER(registry.path) LIKE "*\\\\networkprovider\\\\providerpath" AND NOT ((TO_LOWER(registry.data.strings) LIKE "*\\\\system32\\\\*" OR TO_LOWER(registry.data.strings) LIKE "*\\\\syswow64\\\\*"))) OR (TO_LOWER(registry.path) LIKE "*\\\\networkprovider\\\\order\\\\providerorder" OR TO_LOWER(registry.path) LIKE "*\\\\networkprovider\\\\hworder\\\\providerorder"))

Wazuh · XML rule

Deploy to your manager — this is a rule, not a search.

<group name="sigma,windows,registry_set,">  <!-- Rule ids must be unique on your manager; 100000+ is the user range. -->  <!-- 2 rules: the Sigma condition ORs across different fields,       which one rule cannot express. Any one matching is a hit. -->  <rule id="100000" level="7">    <!-- Set <if_sid> to the decoder/base rule for windows so this only evaluates relevant events. -->    <field name="TargetObject" type="pcre2">(?i)\\NetworkProvider\\ProviderPath$</field>    <field name="Details" negate="yes" type="pcre2">(?i)(\\System32\\|\\SysWOW64\\)</field>    <description>Network provider DLL registered in the registry (1/2)</description>    <mitre>      <id>T1556.008</id>    </mitre>  </rule>   <rule id="100001" level="7">    <!-- Set <if_sid> to the decoder/base rule for windows so this only evaluates relevant events. -->    <field name="TargetObject" type="pcre2">(?i)(\\NetworkProvider\\Order\\ProviderOrder$|\\NetworkProvider\\HwOrder\\ProviderOrder$)</field>    <description>Network provider DLL registered in the registry (2/2)</description>    <mitre>      <id>T1556.008</id>    </mitre>  </rule></group>

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