Reporting Message
Where this stands
No Sigma rule can address this — the telemetry MITRE names has no Sigma logsource behind it.
Sigma has no logsource taxonomy for ICS. MITRE's telemetry here is operational historians and controller state, which no Sigma rule can address.
What the technique is
Adversaries may spoof reporting messages in control system environments for evasion and to impair process control. In control systems, reporting messages contain telemetry data (e.g., I/O values) pertaining to the current state of equipment and the industrial process. Reporting messages are important for monitoring the normal operation of a system or identifying important events such as deviations from expected values. If an adversary has the ability to Spoof Reporting Messages, they can impact the control system in many ways. The adversary can Spoof Reporting Messages that state that the process is operating normally, as a form of evasion. The adversary could also Spoof Reporting Messages to make the defenders and operators think that other errors are occurring in order to distract them from the actual source of a problem.
Read it on attack.mitre.orgWhat MITRE says you would watch
- AN1879
Various techniques enable spoofing a reporting message. Consider monitoring for Rogue Master and Adversary-in-the-Middle activity which may precede this technique. Monitor asset logs for alarms or other information the adversary is unable to directly suppress. Relevant alarms include those from a loss of communications due to Adversary-in-the-Middle activity. Various techniques enable spoofing a reporting message. Monitor for LLMNR/NBT-NS poisoning via new services/daemons which may be used to enable this technique. For added context on adversary procedures and background see Name Resolution Poisoning and SMB Relay. […]
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