Contact List
Where this stands
No Sigma rule can address this — the telemetry MITRE names has no Sigma logsource behind it.
Sigma has no logsource taxonomy for mobile platforms. MITRE's telemetry here is mobile EDR and device APIs, which no Sigma rule can address.
What the technique is
Adversaries may utilize standard operating system APIs to gather contact list data. On Android, this can be accomplished using the Contacts Content Provider. On iOS, this can be accomplished using the Contacts framework. If the device has been jailbroken or rooted, an adversary may be able to access the Contact List without the user’s knowledge or approval.
Read it on attack.mitre.orgWhat MITRE says you would watch
- AN1782
OLD: Application vetting services could look for android.permission.READ_CONTACTS in an Android application’s manifest, or NSContactsUsageDescription in an iOS application’s Info.plist file. Most applications do not need contact list access, so extra scrutiny could be applied to those that request it. On both Android and iOS, the user can manage which applications have permission to access the contact list through the device settings screen, revoking the permission if necessary. NEW: A defender observes an Android application requesting for android.permission.READ_CONTACTS, which may also be listed in the application's manifest file.
- AN1783
Application vetting services could look for android.permission.READ_CONTACTS in an Android application’s manifest, or NSContactsUsageDescription in an iOS application’s Info.plist file. Most applications do not need contact list access, so extra scrutiny could be applied to those that request it. On both Android and iOS, the user can manage which applications have permission to access the contact list through the device settings screen, revoking the permission if necessary.
Technique names and descriptions © MITRE ATT&CK®, CC BY 4.0. Not endorsed by MITRE.