Escape to Host
Where this stands
One published detection covers this technique. Every one is unverified — no rule on Siemphony has been executed against real telemetry.
What the technique is
Adversaries may break out of a container or virtualized environment to gain access to the underlying host. This can allow an adversary access to other containerized or virtualized resources from the host level or to the host itself. In principle, containerized / virtualized resources should provide a clear separation of application functionality and be isolated from the host environment. There are multiple ways an adversary may escape from a container to a host environment. Examples include creating a container configured to mount the host’s filesystem using the bind parameter, which allows the adversary to drop payloads and execute control utilities such as cron on the host; utilizing a privileged container to run commands or load a malicious kernel module on the underlying host; or abusing system calls such as unshare and keyctl to escalate privileges and steal secrets. Additionally, an adversary may be able to exploit a compromised container with a mounted container management socket, such as docker.sock, to break out of the container via a Container Administration Command. Adversaries may also escape via Exploitation for Privilege Escalation, such as exploiting vulnerabilities in global symbolic links in order to access the root directory of a host machine. […]
Read it on attack.mitre.orgWhat MITRE says you would watch
- AN0612
Detection of container escape attempts via bind mounts, privileged containers, or abuse of docker.sock. Defenders may observe anomalous volume mount configurations (e.g., hostPath to / or /proc), unexpected privileged container launches, or use of container administration commands to access host resources. These events typically correlate with subsequent process execution on the host outside of normal container isolation.
- AN0613
Detection of Linux container escape attempts via syscalls (unshare, keyctl, mount) or process execution outside container namespaces. Defenders may correlate unusual system calls from containerized processes with subsequent process creation on the host or modification of host resources.
- AN0614
Detection of Windows container escape attempts by observing processes accessing host directories, symbolic link abuse, or privilege escalation attempts. Defenders may detect anomalous process execution with access to system-level directories outside of container boundaries.
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