Proxy Through Victim
Where this stands
No Sigma rule can address this — the telemetry MITRE names has no Sigma logsource behind it.
Sigma has no logsource taxonomy for mobile platforms. MITRE's telemetry here is mobile EDR and device APIs, which no Sigma rule can address.
What the technique is
Adversaries may use a compromised device as a proxy server to the Internet. By utilizing a proxy, adversaries hide the true IP address of their C2 server and associated infrastructure from the destination of the network traffic. This masquerades an adversary’s traffic as legitimate traffic originating from the compromised device, which can evade IP-based restrictions and alerts on certain services, such as bank accounts and social media websites. The most common type of proxy is a SOCKS proxy. It can typically be implemented using standard OS-level APIs and 3rd party libraries with no indication to the user. On Android, adversaries can use the Proxy API to programmatically establish a SOCKS proxy connection, or lower-level APIs to interact directly with raw sockets.
Read it on attack.mitre.orgWhat MITRE says you would watch
- AN1702
The defender correlates proxy-capable network setup or socket-handling behavior with subsequent bidirectional traffic relaying through the same device and app context, especially when inbound client sessions are followed by outbound connections to unrelated remote destinations or when the device sustains multiplexed traffic patterns inconsistent with normal mobile app workflows. The analytic prioritizes Android-observable effects: proxy or raw-socket setup, app background execution, inbound-to-outbound traffic bridging, and sustained relayed flows to multiple destinations without recent user interaction.
Technique names and descriptions © MITRE ATT&CK®, CC BY 4.0. Not endorsed by MITRE.