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Every technique
T1583.001Not expressible in Sigma

Domains

Resource DevelopmentPRE

Where this stands

No Sigma rule can address this — the telemetry MITRE names has no Sigma logsource behind it.

This happens on infrastructure you do not own, so it never reaches your logs. MITRE's own guidance is internet scanning and threat intelligence, not log analysis.

What the technique is

Adversaries may acquire domains that can be used during targeting. Domain names are the human readable names used to represent one or more IP addresses. They can be purchased or, in some cases, acquired for free. Adversaries may use acquired domains for a variety of purposes, including for Phishing, Drive-by Compromise, and Command and Control. Adversaries may choose domains that are similar to legitimate domains, including through use of homoglyphs or use of a different top-level domain (TLD). Typosquatting may be used to aid in delivery of payloads via Drive-by Compromise. Adversaries may also use internationalized domain names (IDNs) and different character sets (e.g. Cyrillic, Greek, etc.) to execute "IDN homograph attacks," creating visually similar lookalike domains used to deliver malware to victim machines. Different URIs/URLs may also be dynamically generated to uniquely serve malicious content to victims (including one-time, single use domain names). Adversaries may also acquire and repurpose expired domains, which may be potentially already allowlisted/trusted by defenders based on an existing reputation/history. Domain registrars each maintain a publicly viewable database that displays contact information for every registered domain. Private WHOIS services display alternative information, such as their own company data, rather than the owner of the domain. […]

Read it on attack.mitre.org

What MITRE says you would watch

  • AN2024

    Monitor logged domain name system (DNS) data for purchased domains that can be used during targeting. Reputation/category-based detection may be difficult until the categorization is updated. Detection efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Initial Access and Command and Control. Domain registration information is, by design, captured in public registration logs. Consider use of services that may aid in tracking of newly acquired domains, such as WHOIS databases and/or passive DNS. In some cases it may be possible to pivot on known pieces of domain registration information to uncover other infrastructure purchased by the adversary. […]

Technique names and descriptions © MITRE ATT&CK®, CC BY 4.0. Not endorsed by MITRE.