SMS Control
Where this stands
No Sigma rule can address this — the telemetry MITRE names has no Sigma logsource behind it.
Sigma has no logsource taxonomy for mobile platforms. MITRE's telemetry here is mobile EDR and device APIs, which no Sigma rule can address.
What the technique is
Adversaries may delete, alter, or send SMS messages without user authorization. This could be used to hide C2 SMS messages, spread malware, or various external effects. This can be accomplished by requesting the RECEIVE_SMS or SEND_SMS permissions depending on what the malware is attempting to do. If the app is set as the default SMS handler on the device, the SMS_DELIVER broadcast intent can be registered, which allows the app to write to the SMS content provider. The content provider directly modifies the messaging database on the device, which could allow malicious applications with this ability to insert, modify, or delete arbitrary messages on the device.
Read it on attack.mitre.orgWhat MITRE says you would watch
- AN1645
The defender correlates SMS-relevant permission state or default SMS handler role with subsequent unauthorized SMS send, receive interception, message database modification, deletion, or concealment behavior by an application outside expected messaging workflows. The analytic prioritizes Android-observable control-plane effects: SEND_SMS or RECEIVE_SMS capability, default SMS handler change or exercise of SMS_DELIVER semantics, direct interaction with the SMS content provider or messaging database, and SMS activity occurring from background or locked-device state without recent user interaction.
Technique names and descriptions © MITRE ATT&CK®, CC BY 4.0. Not endorsed by MITRE.