Path Interception by Unquoted Path
Where this stands
One published detection covers this technique. Every one is unverified — no rule on Siemphony has been executed against real telemetry.
What the technique is
Adversaries may execute their own malicious payloads by hijacking vulnerable file path references. Adversaries can take advantage of paths that lack surrounding quotations by placing an executable in a higher level directory within the path, so that Windows will choose the adversary's executable to launch. Service paths and shortcut paths may also be vulnerable to path interception if the path has one or more spaces and is not surrounded by quotation marks (e.g., C:\unsafe path with space\program.exe vs. "C:\safe path with space\program.exe"). (stored in Windows Registry keys) An adversary can place an executable in a higher level directory of the path, and Windows will resolve that executable instead of the intended executable. For example, if the path in a shortcut is C:\program files\myapp.exe, an adversary may create a program at C:\program.exe that will be run instead of the intended program. This technique can be used for persistence if executables are called on a regular basis, as well as privilege escalation if intercepted executables are started by a higher privileged process.
Read it on attack.mitre.orgWhat MITRE says you would watch
- AN0176
Unquoted service or shortcut paths that contain spaces and allow path interception by higher-level executables. Defender observes registry service configurations with unquoted paths, file creation of executables in parent directories of unquoted paths, and subsequent process execution from unexpected locations.
Technique names and descriptions © MITRE ATT&CK®, CC BY 4.0. Not endorsed by MITRE.