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Every technique
T1564.004Detection written

NTFS File Attributes

StealthWindows

Where this stands

One published detection covers this technique. Every one is unverified — no rule on Siemphony has been executed against real telemetry.

What the technique is

Adversaries may use NTFS file attributes to hide their malicious data in order to evade detection. Every New Technology File System (NTFS) formatted partition contains a Master File Table (MFT) that maintains a record for every file/directory on the partition. Within MFT entries are file attributes, such as Extended Attributes (EA) and Data [known as Alternate Data Streams (ADSs) when more than one Data attribute is present], that can be used to store arbitrary data (and even complete files). Adversaries may store malicious data or binaries in file attribute metadata instead of directly in files. This may be done to evade some defenses, such as static indicator scanning tools and anti-virus.

Read it on attack.mitre.org

What MITRE says you would watch

  • AN1206

    Suspicious use of NTFS file attributes such as Alternate Data Streams (ADS) or Extended Attributes (EA) to hide data. Defender perspective: anomalous file creations or modifications containing colon syntax (file.ext:ads), API calls like ZwSetEaFile/ZwQueryEaFile, or PowerShell/Windows utilities interacting with -stream parameters. Correlation across file metadata anomalies, process lineage, and command execution provides context.

Technique names and descriptions © MITRE ATT&CK®, CC BY 4.0. Not endorsed by MITRE.