Container API
Where this stands
No Sigma rule can address this — the telemetry MITRE names has no Sigma logsource behind it.
None of MITRE's analytics for this technique name a log source that maps to a Sigma logsource — they describe abstract data ("Process::None"), API-hook telemetry, or prose channels with no reliable field names behind them.
What the technique is
Adversaries may gather credentials via APIs within a containers environment. APIs in these environments, such as the Docker API and Kubernetes APIs, allow a user to remotely manage their container resources and cluster components. An adversary may access the Docker API to collect logs that contain credentials to cloud, container, and various other resources in the environment. An adversary with sufficient permissions, such as via a pod's service account, may also use the Kubernetes API to retrieve credentials from the Kubernetes API server. These credentials may include those needed for Docker API authentication or secrets from Kubernetes cluster components.
Read it on attack.mitre.orgWhat MITRE says you would watch
- AN0571
Detection correlates anomalous Docker or Kubernetes API requests with access to logs, secrets, or service accounts. Observes unauthorized use of docker logs, kubectl get secrets, or direct API calls to Kubernetes API server endpoints. Identifies behavioral patterns where adversaries escalate from basic pod/container interaction to privileged API calls exposing sensitive credential material.
Technique names and descriptions © MITRE ATT&CK®, CC BY 4.0. Not endorsed by MITRE.