Skip to content
Every technique
T1525Not expressible in Sigma

Implant Internal Image

PersistenceIaaS, Containers

Where this stands

No Sigma rule can address this — the telemetry MITRE names has no Sigma logsource behind it.

None of MITRE's analytics for this technique name a log source that maps to a Sigma logsource — they describe abstract data ("Process::None"), API-hook telemetry, or prose channels with no reliable field names behind them.

What the technique is

Adversaries may implant cloud or container images with malicious code to establish persistence after gaining access to an environment. Amazon Web Services (AWS) Amazon Machine Images (AMIs), Google Cloud Platform (GCP) Images, and Azure Images as well as popular container runtimes such as Docker can be implanted or backdoored. Unlike Upload Malware, this technique focuses on adversaries implanting an image in a registry within a victim’s environment. Depending on how the infrastructure is provisioned, this could provide persistent access if the infrastructure provisioning tool is instructed to always use the latest image. A tool has been developed to facilitate planting backdoors in cloud container images. If an adversary has access to a compromised AWS instance, and permissions to list the available container images, they may implant a backdoor such as a Web Shell.

Read it on attack.mitre.org

What MITRE says you would watch

  • AN0946

    Implantation of malicious code into container images followed by registry push and use in new deployments.

  • AN0947

    Creation or modification of cloud virtual machine images (AMIs, custom images) with persistence mechanisms, followed by infrastructure provisioning that uses these implanted images.

Technique names and descriptions © MITRE ATT&CK®, CC BY 4.0. Not endorsed by MITRE.