Backup Software Discovery
Where this stands
One published detection covers this technique. Every one is unverified — no rule on Siemphony has been executed against real telemetry.
What the technique is
Adversaries may attempt to get a listing of backup software or configurations that are installed on a system. Adversaries may use this information to shape follow-on behaviors, such as Data Destruction, Inhibit System Recovery, or Data Encrypted for Impact. Commands that can be used to obtain security software information are netsh, reg query with Reg, dir with cmd, and Tasklist, but other indicators of discovery behavior may be more specific to the type of software or security system the adversary is looking for, such as Veeam, Acronis, Dropbox, or Paragon.
Read it on attack.mitre.orgWhat MITRE says you would watch
- AN0240
Defender observes execution of commands like tasklist, sc query, reg query, or PowerShell WMI/Registry queries targeting known backup products (e.g., Veeam, Acronis, CrashPlan). Behavior often includes parent-child lineage involving PowerShell or cmd.exe with discovery syntax, and enumeration of services, directories, or registry paths tied to backup software.
- AN0241
Defender observes use of CLI tools (find, grep, ls, dpkg, rpm, systemctl, ps aux) to discover backup agents or config files (e.g., rsnapshot, duplicity, veeam). This often includes command lines that recursively search /etc/, /opt/, or /var/ directories for keywords like backup, and parent-child relationships involving shell or Python scripts.
- AN0242
Defender detects execution of mdfind, launchctl, or GUI-based enumeration (e.g., /Applications/Time Machine.app) along with command-line usage of find, grep, or system_profiler to identify installed backup tools like Time Machine, Carbon Copy Cloner, or Backblaze. Often triggered from Terminal sessions or within post-exploitation scripts.
Technique names and descriptions © MITRE ATT&CK®, CC BY 4.0. Not endorsed by MITRE.