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Every technique
T1430Not expressible in SigmaMOBILE

Location Tracking

Collection · DiscoveryAndroid, iOS

Where this stands

No Sigma rule can address this — the telemetry MITRE names has no Sigma logsource behind it.

Sigma has no logsource taxonomy for mobile platforms. MITRE's telemetry here is mobile EDR and device APIs, which no Sigma rule can address.

What the technique is

Adversaries may track a device’s physical location through use of standard operating system APIs via malicious or exploited applications on the compromised device. On Android, applications holding the ACCESS_COAURSE_LOCATION or ACCESS_FINE_LOCATION permissions provide access to the device’s physical location. On Android 10 and up, declaration of the ACCESS_BACKGROUND_LOCATION permission in an application’s manifest will allow applications to request location access even when the application is running in the background. Some adversaries have utilized integration of Baidu map services to retrieve geographical location once the location access permissions had been obtained. On iOS, applications must include the NSLocationWhenInUseUsageDescription, NSLocationAlwaysAndWhenInUseUsageDescription, and/or NSLocationAlwaysUsageDescription keys in their Info.plist file depending on the extent of requested access to location information. On iOS 8.0 and up, applications call requestWhenInUseAuthorization() to request access to location information when the application is in use or requestAlwaysAuthorization() to request access to location information regardless of whether the application is in use. With elevated privileges, an adversary may be able to access location data without explicit user consent with the com.apple.locationd.preauthorized entitlement key.

Read it on attack.mitre.org

What MITRE says you would watch

  • AN1776

    Defender correlates an application gaining/retaining fine or background location capability with subsequent location sensor sessions that occur while the app is backgrounded or the device is locked, followed by repeated location reads at a periodic cadence and near-term outbound connections to domains not typical for fleet navigation/MDM services, indicating covert location tracking.

  • AN1777

    Defender correlates an application’s location authorization level (When-In-Use vs Always) and entitlement posture with observed location sensor activity that occurs without proximate user interaction, including background updates, followed by periodic outbound network sessions aligned to location update timing—suggesting covert or policy-violating location tracking.

Technique names and descriptions © MITRE ATT&CK®, CC BY 4.0. Not endorsed by MITRE.