Input Capture
Where this stands
No Sigma rule can address this — the telemetry MITRE names has no Sigma logsource behind it.
Sigma has no logsource taxonomy for mobile platforms. MITRE's telemetry here is mobile EDR and device APIs, which no Sigma rule can address.
What the technique is
Adversaries may use methods of capturing user input to obtain credentials or collect information. During normal device usage, users often provide credentials to various locations, such as login pages/portals or system dialog boxes. Input capture mechanisms may be transparent to the user (e.g. Keylogging) or rely on deceiving the user into providing input into what they believe to be a genuine application prompt (e.g. GUI Input Capture).
Read it on attack.mitre.orgWhat MITRE says you would watch
- AN1825
Defender observes an app gaining input-observation capability (AccessibilityService enablement, default IME set, draw-over-apps permission), then creating an intercept surface (overlay window, accessibility event stream consumption or IME keystroke callbacks), followed by persistence (local keylog/clipboard dump) and/or small, frequent network egress. Chain: capability/permission → listener/overlay activation → bursty input read events → local write → near-term exfil.
- AN1826
Defender observes an app enabling or using input-capture surfaces (custom keyboard extension with Full Access, abnormal UI text entry interception, pasteboard polling adjacent to login screens), then persisting and/or exfiltrating captured input. Chain: capability/consent (TCC for keyboard Full Access or input privacy domains) → intercept behavior (keyboard extension active, repeated text field ‘editingChanged’/secure entry focus, background pasteboard reads) → local write → near-term egress.
Technique names and descriptions © MITRE ATT&CK®, CC BY 4.0. Not endorsed by MITRE.