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Every technique
T1407Not expressible in SigmaMOBILE

Download New Code at Runtime

Defense EvasionAndroid, iOS

Where this stands

No Sigma rule can address this — the telemetry MITRE names has no Sigma logsource behind it.

Sigma has no logsource taxonomy for mobile platforms. MITRE's telemetry here is mobile EDR and device APIs, which no Sigma rule can address.

What the technique is

Adversaries may download and execute dynamic code not included in the original application package after installation. This technique is primarily used to evade static analysis checks and pre-publication scans in official app stores. In some cases, more advanced dynamic or behavioral analysis techniques could detect this behavior. However, in conjunction with Execution Guardrails techniques, detecting malicious code downloaded after installation could be difficult. On Android, dynamic code could include native code, Dalvik code, or JavaScript code that utilizes Android WebView’s JavascriptInterface capability. On iOS, dynamic code could be downloaded and executed through 3rd party libraries such as JSPatch.

Read it on attack.mitre.org

What MITRE says you would watch

  • AN1677

    From the defender’s view: an app retrieves opaque code (DEX/SO/JAR/JS) over the network or IPC, writes it into an app-writable path, optionally performs verification-bypass behaviors (reflection, addJavascriptInterface exposure, or execmem friction), and then loads/executes that code via DexClassLoader/PathClassLoader, dlopen, or WebView bridge invocation within a short window. The analytic correlates Network Content → File Creation/Modification → OS API Execution (loader/syscall/SELinux friction) → Module Load (DexClassLoader/dlopen) and, for WebView paths, Application Log signals of JavaScript interface attachment.

  • AN1678

    From the defender’s view: a sandboxed app retrieves code-like content (JS/Mach-O/bundles), writes it to container tmp/Caches, performs memory permission changes (RW→RX/RWX) or directly loads via dyld/dlopen from writable paths, sometimes preceded by 3rd-party hotpatch frameworks (e.g., JSPatch-like behavior) or script engine evaluation. The analytic correlates Network Content → File Creation → OS API Execution (memory permission change) → Module Load (dyld/dlopen) and/or Process Access (codesign validation touches), with optional scripting engine events.

Technique names and descriptions © MITRE ATT&CK®, CC BY 4.0. Not endorsed by MITRE.