Electron Applications
Where this stands
One published detection covers this technique. Every one is unverified — no rule on Siemphony has been executed against real telemetry.
What the technique is
Adversaries may abuse components of the Electron framework to execute malicious code. The Electron framework hosts many common applications such as Signal, Slack, and Microsoft Teams. Originally developed by GitHub, Electron is a cross-platform desktop application development framework that employs web technologies like JavaScript, HTML, and CSS. The Chromium engine is used to display web content and Node.js runs the backend code. Due to the functional mechanics of Electron (such as allowing apps to run arbitrary commands), adversaries may also be able to perform malicious functions in the background potentially disguised as legitimate tools within the framework. For example, the abuse of teams.exe and chrome.exe may allow adversaries to execute malicious commands as child processes of the legitimate application (e.g., chrome.exe --disable-gpu-sandbox --gpu-launcher="C:\Windows\system32\cmd.exe /c calc.exe). Adversaries may also execute malicious content by planting malicious JavaScript within Electron applications.
Read it on attack.mitre.orgWhat MITRE says you would watch
- AN0071
Abuse of trusted Electron apps (Teams, Slack, Chrome) to spawn child processes or execute payloads via malicious command-line arguments (e.g., --gpu-launcher) and modified app resources (.asar). Behavior chain: suspicious parent process (Electron app) → unusual command-line args → child process creation → optional DLL/network artifacts.
- AN0072
Abuse of Linux Electron binaries by modifying app.asar or config JS files and spawning unexpected child processes (bash, curl, python).
- AN0073
Abuse of macOS Electron apps by modifying app.asar bundles and spawning child processes (osascript, curl, sh) from Electron executables.
Technique names and descriptions © MITRE ATT&CK®, CC BY 4.0. Not endorsed by MITRE.