T1195No distinct observable

Supply Chain Compromise

Initial AccessLinux, Windows, macOS, SaaS

Where this stands

A reviewer read the telemetry and concluded there is nothing here to detect that a sibling technique does not already cover.

All three analytics (Windows/Linux/macOS) are the same install/update-tamper -> first-run chain. AN1480 (Windows installer/updater writes binaries, first run spawns children) is verbatim what T1195.002 already detects. AN1481 (package manager installs from non-approved repos) is T1195.001 on Linux. AN1482 is the same on macOS. The genuinely parent-level scenarios in the technique text -- factory-infected images, removable media, shipment interdiction -- have no host telemetry in the brief at all.

Covered instead by T1195.001, T1195.002.

What the technique is

Adversaries may manipulate products or product delivery mechanisms prior to receipt by a final consumer for the purpose of data or system compromise. Supply chain compromise can take place at any stage of the supply chain including: Manipulation of development tools Manipulation of a development environment Manipulation of source code repositories (public or private) Manipulation of source code in open-source dependencies Manipulation of software update/distribution mechanisms Compromised/infected system images (removable media infected at the factory) Replacement of legitimate software with modified versions Sales of modified/counterfeit products to legitimate distributors Shipment interdiction While supply chain compromise can impact any component of hardware or software, adversaries looking to gain execution have often focused on malicious additions to legitimate software in software distribution or update channels. Adversaries may limit targeting to a desired victim set or distribute malicious software to a broad set of consumers but only follow up with specific victims. Popular open-source projects that are used as dependencies in many applications may also be targeted as a means to add malicious code to users of the dependency. […]

Read it on attack.mitre.org

What MITRE says you would watch

AN1480
1) New or updated software is delivered/installed from atypical sources or with signature/hash mismatches; 2) installer/updater writes binaries to unexpected paths or replaces existing signed files; 3) first run causes unsigned/abnormally signed modules to load or child processes to execute, optionally followed by network egress to new destinations.
AN1481
1) Package manager or curl/wget installs/upgrades from non-approved repos or unsigned packages; 2) new ELF written into PATH directories or replacement of existing binaries/libraries; 3) first run leads to unexpected child processes or outbound connections.
AN1482
1) pkg/notarization installs from atypical sources or with Gatekeeper/AMFI warnings; 2) new Mach-O written into /Applications or ~/Library paths or substitution of signed components; 3) first run from installer spawns unsigned children or exfil.