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Every technique
T1070.004Detection written

File Deletion

StealthESXi, Linux, macOS, Windows

Where this stands

One published detection covers this technique. Every one is unverified — no rule on Siemphony has been executed against real telemetry.

What the technique is

Adversaries may delete files left behind by the actions of their intrusion activity. Malware, tools, or other non-native files dropped or created on a system by an adversary (ex: Ingress Tool Transfer) may leave traces to indicate to what was done within a network and how. Removal of these files can occur during an intrusion, or as part of a post-intrusion process to minimize the adversary's footprint. There are tools available from the host operating system to perform cleanup, but adversaries may use other tools as well. Examples of built-in Command and Scripting Interpreter functions include del on Windows, rm or unlink on Linux and macOS, and rm on ESXi.

Read it on attack.mitre.org

What MITRE says you would watch

  • AN0392

    Detects adversary behavior deleting artifacts (e.g., dropped payloads, evidence files) using native or external utilities (e.g., del, erase, SDelete). Detects deletion events correlated with unusual process lineage or timing post-execution.

  • AN0393

    Detects deletion of suspicious files (e.g., payloads, temp exes, scripts) via rm, unlink, or secure deletion tools like shred, especially when performed by unexpected users or shortly after execution.

  • AN0394

    Detects removal of adversary artifacts via rm, unlink, or secure tools, with focus on shell sessions, temp files, and modified LaunchAgents or system directories.

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