Cloud Services
Where this stands
No Sigma rule can address this — the telemetry MITRE names has no Sigma logsource behind it.
None of MITRE's analytics for this technique name a log source that maps to a Sigma logsource — they describe abstract data ("Process::None"), API-hook telemetry, or prose channels with no reliable field names behind them.
What the technique is
Adversaries may log into accessible cloud services within a compromised environment using Valid Accounts that are synchronized with or federated to on-premises user identities. The adversary may then perform management actions or access cloud-hosted resources as the logged-on user. Many enterprises federate centrally managed user identities to cloud services, allowing users to login with their domain credentials in order to access the cloud control plane. Similarly, adversaries may connect to available cloud services through the web console or through the cloud command line interface (CLI) (e.g., Cloud API), using commands such as Connect-AZAccount for Azure PowerShell, Connect-MgGraph for Microsoft Graph PowerShell, and gcloud auth login for the Google Cloud CLI. In some cases, adversaries may be able to authenticate to these services via Application Access Token instead of a username and password.
Read it on attack.mitre.orgWhat MITRE says you would watch
- AN0017
Cloud login from atypical geolocation or user-agent string, followed by resource enumeration or infrastructure manipulation using cloud CLI/API
- AN0018
Federated login using SSO or OAuth grant to cloud control plane, followed by directory or permissions enumeration
- AN0019
Login to M365 or Google Workspace from CLI tools or unexpected source IPs, followed by mailbox or document access
Technique names and descriptions © MITRE ATT&CK®, CC BY 4.0. Not endorsed by MITRE.