DCSync
Where this stands
One published detection covers this technique. Every one is unverified — no rule on Siemphony has been executed against real telemetry.
What the technique is
Adversaries may attempt to access credentials and other sensitive information by abusing a Windows Domain Controller's application programming interface (API) to simulate the replication process from a remote domain controller using a technique called DCSync. Members of the Administrators, Domain Admins, and Enterprise Admin groups or computer accounts on the domain controller are able to run DCSync to pull password data from Active Directory, which may include current and historical hashes of potentially useful accounts such as KRBTGT and Administrators. The hashes can then in turn be used to create a Golden Ticket for use in Pass the Ticket or change an account's password as noted in Account Manipulation. DCSync functionality has been included in the "lsadump" module in Mimikatz. Lsadump also includes NetSync, which performs DCSync over a legacy replication protocol.
Read it on attack.mitre.orgWhat MITRE says you would watch
- AN1632
Detects unauthorized invocation of replication operations (DCSync) via Directory Replication Service (DRS), often executed by threat actors using Mimikatz or similar tools from non-DC endpoints.
Technique names and descriptions © MITRE ATT&CK®, CC BY 4.0. Not endorsed by MITRE.